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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
A police officer stopped Gerald Roger Cessnun for driving with a broken tail light.
Eventually, the police officer searched the vehicle and found a gun and controlled substances.
Mr. Cessnun moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless search. The district
court denied his motion. Mr. Cessnun then entered a conditional Alford1 plea, reserving his right
to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion. Mr. Cessnun appeals to this Court.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On December 10, 2015, around 11:36 p.m., Officer Mitchell Tiner stopped a truck driven
by Mr. Cessnun for a broken tail light. (R., p.163.) Officer Tiner searched the truck and found a
gun and controlled substances. (R., p.163.) The State subsequently filed a Complaint alleging
Mr. Cessnun committed the crimes of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to
deliver (marijuana), in violation of I.C. § 37-2732(a), three counts of possession of a controlled
substance (methamphetamine, Hydromorphone, and Buprenorphine or Naloxone), in violation of
I.C. § 37-2732(c), and unlawful possession of a firearm, in violation of I.C. § 18-3316.
(R., pp.14–16; see also R., pp.58–60 (Amended Complaint).) After a preliminary hearing, the
magistrate found probable cause for the offenses and bound Mr. Cessnun over to district court.
(R., pp.55–57, 61–63.) The State then filed an Information charging Mr. Cessnun with
possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver, three counts of possession of a
controlled substance, and unlawful possession of a firearm. (R., pp.66–67.)
1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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Mr.  Cessnun  moved  to  suppress  the  evidence  obtained  from  the  search  of  the  vehicle.
(R., pp.90–99.) The State opposed the motion. (R., pp.104–11.) The district court held a hearing
on the motion on May 31, 2016. (See Tr. Vol. I,2 p.5, L.1–p.76, L.3.) At the start of the hearing,
Mr. Cessnun informed the district court that he would limit his basis for suppression to only the
validity of the traffic stop—whether Officer Tiner had reasonable suspicion to believe
Mr. Cessnun committed a traffic violation for driving with a broken tail light.3 (Tr. Vol. I, p.5,
L.12–p.6, L.19.) Three witnesses testified for the defense:  (1) a long-time friend, Emma Bowen;
(2)  Mr.  Cessnun’s  girlfriend,  Lynda  Leamaster;  and  (3)  the  owner  of  the  vehicle  and
Mr. Cessnun’s employer, William Strack. (Tr. Vol. I, p.11, L.12–p.22, L.22, p.24, L.8–p.42,
L.22, p.45, L.4–p.47, L.5.) Ms. Bowen saw the truck about three hours before the traffic stop,
Ms. Leamaster picked up the truck two days after the stop, and Mr. Strack regained possession of
the truck “several days” after the stop. (R., pp.164–65.) They each testified that they did not see a
broken tail light. (R., pp.164–65; see also Tr. Vol. I, p.11, L.23–p.13, L.14, p.14, Ls.5–8, p.24,
L.25–p.28, L.3, p.46, L.11–p.47, L.17.) Conversely, Officer Tiner testified that he saw a broken
tail light. (R., p.163; see also Tr. Vol. I, p.50, L.7–p.51, L.2, p.57, L.23–p.58, L.9.) At the end of
the hearing, the district court took the matter under advisement. (Tr. Vol. I, p.74, Ls.10–11.) The
parties submitted written closing arguments. (R., pp.128–32, 153–56.) Along with its closing
2 There are three transcripts on appeal. The first, cited at Volume I, contains the suppression
motion hearing, held on May 31, 2016. The second, cited as Volume II, contains the four
hearings: a status hearing on June 20, 2016, the entry of plea hearing on August 8, 2016, another
status hearing on October 24, 2016, and the sentencing hearing on November 2, 2016. Finally,
the third transcript, cited as Volume III, contains another status hearing, held on July 25, 2016.
3 Idaho Code § 49-906(1) states in relevant part: “Every motor vehicle . . . shall be equipped with
at least one (1) tail lamp mounted on the rear, which when lighted as required, shall emit a red
light plainly visible from a distance of five hundred (500) feet to the rear.”
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argument, the State submitted audio recordings of jail calls between Mr. Cessnun and
Ms. Leamaster. (R., p.131; State’s Ex. 8.)
On June 27, 2016, the district court issued a memorandum decision and order on the
suppression motion. (R., pp.162–66.) The district court found Ms. Bowen’s, Ms. Leamaster’s,
and Mr. Strack’s testimony lacked credibility and reliability. (R., pp.163 n.1, 164–66 & nn.3–4.)
The district court found Officer Tiner to be credible and thus ruled Officer Tiner had reasonable
suspicion to stop Mr. Cessnun for the broken tail light traffic violation. (R., pp.163 n.1, 164–66.)
Accordingly, the district court denied Mr. Cessnun’s motion. (R., p.166.)
Pursuant  to  a  plea  agreement  with  the  State,  Mr.  Cessnun  entered  a  conditional Alford
plea to possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver and unlawful possession of
a firearm. (Tr. Vol. II, p.15, L.14–p.17, L.3, p.19, L.17–p.20, L.22, p.35, L.24–p.37, L.1) The
State agreed to dismiss the other charges.4 (Tr. Vol. II, p.16, Ls.22–25.) Mr. Cessnun reserved
his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. (Tr. Vol. II, p.30, Ls.9–24;
see also R., p.189 (guilty plea advisory form).)
The district court sentenced Mr. Cessnun to five years, with two and one-half years fixed,
for possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver and five years, with no fixed
years, for unlawful possession of a firearm, to be served consecutively. (Tr. Vol. II, p.77, Ls.13–
25.) Mr. Cessnun filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the district court’s Judgment of
4 The  State  also  agreed  to  “not  file  an  Information  Part  II,”  but  the  record  indicates  the  State
already filed an Information Part II. (Tr., p.16, Ls.20–25; R., pp. 158–60 (Information Part II),
p.187 (guilty plea advisory form indicating State would not file an Information Part II).)
Mr. Cessnun’s sentence, however, was not enhanced pursuant to the persistent violator
enhancement. (See Tr. Vol. II, p.77, L.13–p.78, L.12.) In addition, the judgment of conviction
does not contain a conviction for the enhancement. (R., pp.196–99.)
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Conviction and Commitment. (R., pp.196–99, 203–05; see also R., pp.222–25 (amended
judgment to correct credit for time served).)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Cessnun’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Cessnun’s Motion To Suppress
The only issue raised in Mr. Cessnun’s motion to suppress was whether Officer Tiner had
reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop. (Tr. Vol. I, p.5, L.12–p.6, L.19.) In  turn, this issue
depended on whether Mr. Cessnun in fact had a broken tail light at the time Officer Tiner
initiated the traffic stop. The district court heard competing testimony on this issue—Officer
Tiner testified that he saw a broken tail light, but three witnesses for Mr. Cessnun testified to the
contrary. After the hearing, the district court found Officer Tiner to be credible and
Mr. Cessnun’s witnesses not to be credible. (R., pp.163 n.1, 164–66 & nn.3–4.) Relying on
Officer Tiner’s testimony, the district court found that the tail light was broken. (R., pp.163 n.1,
164–66.) Mindful that the district court’s credibility determinations are unchallengeable on
appeal, see, e.g., State v. Howard, 155 Idaho 666, 672 (Ct. App. 2013), Mr. Cessnun nonetheless
contends  the  district  court  erred  by  finding  the  tail  light  to  be  broken  at  the  time of  the  traffic
stop. As argued by Mr. Cessnun’s trial counsel:
The State contends that [Officer Tiner] saw the broken light and therefore
had a basis for the traffic stop; yet [Mr. Cessnun] was never cited for the
equipment violation nor were any pictures ever taken of the taillight.
[Mr. Cessnun] called three witnesses at the Suppression Hearing [sic]. . . .
The State has presented no evidence to show that any of [Mr. Cessnun’s]
witnesses have lied or that their testimony should be mistrusted or lacked
reliability by the Court. There is no evidence that anyone had tampered with the
truck  from  time  that  Ms.  Bowen  observed  the  truck  to  when  the  truck  was
examined by [Mr.] Strack . . . .
If the right rear light was not damaged, then Officer Tiner did not have a
legal basis for the traffic stop and the subsequent search of the vehicle.
Lastly, this Court has received jail calls [Mr. Cessnun] made shortly after
his arrest. Nothing in those calls in anyway establish[es] that Ms. Leamaster was
lying to this Court at the time of the Suppression Hearing [sic].
(R., pp.155–56.) For the same reasons as argued by Mr. Cessnun’s trial counsel, but mindful of
the case law on appellate review of credibility determinations, Mr. Cessnun asserts the district
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court erred by finding Officer Tiner credible and thus finding the tail light broken at the time of
the traffic stop. Therefore, he contends the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress.
CONCLUSION
Mr.  Cessnun  respectfully  requests  that  this  Court  reverse  the  district  court’s  order
denying his motion to suppress, vacate the district court’s judgment of conviction, and remand
this case for further proceedings. Alternatively, he respectfully requests that this Court vacate the
district court’s order denying his motion to suppress and judgment of conviction and remand this
case for a new suppression motion hearing.
DATED this 5th day of July, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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